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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 21-7-3 (1991) 
Impecunious litigants - Affidavit 
Any person may institute, prosecute, defend 
and appeal any cause in any court in the state 
by taking and subscribing, before any officer 
authorized to administer an oath, the 
following: 
I,A,B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the 
expenses of the action or legal proceedings 
which I am about to commence (or the appeal 
which I am about to take), and that I verily 
believe I am justly entitled to the relief 
sought by such action, legal proceedings or 
appeal. 
RULE 10(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Enforcement by clerk: waiver for pro se parties 
1 
The clerk of the court shall examine all 
pleadings and other papers filed with the 
court. If they are not prepared in conformity 
with this rule, the clerk shall accept the 
filing but may require counsel to substitute 
properly prepared papers for nonconforming 
papers. 
RULE 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Filing appeals from final orders and judgments 
Failure of an appellant to take any step other 
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal 
does not affect the validity of the appeal, 
but is grounds only for such action as the 
appellate court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other 
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the 
award of attorney fees. 
RULE 3(f), Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals 
At the time of filing any notice of separate, 
joint, or cross-appeal in a civil case, the 
party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk 
of the trial court such filing as are 
established by law, and also the fee for 
docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept 
a notice of appeal unless the filing and 
docketing fees are paid. 
RULE 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Appeal from final judgment and order 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the trial court to the 
appellate court, the notice of appeal required 
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within 30 dyas after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered 
in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful 
detainer action, the notice of appeal required 
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED 
Englehorn argues that this court has no jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal because the appeal was not- filed within thirty days of 
the filing of the trial court order* While Englehorn admits that 
a filing took place within thirty days, he claims the filing was a 
nullity because no fee was paid and because the affidavit of 
impecuniosity filed in lieu of the fee was defective• Englehorn 
argues that the affidavit was defective because Bunch did not raise 
her hand and swear an oath to its truthfulness before signing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3 (1991) provides that: 
Any person may institute, prosecute, defend 
and appeal any cause in any court in this 
state by taking and subscribing, before any 
officer authorized to administer an oath, the 
following: 
I,A,B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the 
expenses of the action or legal proceedings 
which I am about to commence (or the appeal 
which I am about to take), and that I verily 
believe I am justly entitled to the relief 
sought by such action, legal proceedings or 
appeal. 
The operative language of this section, as pointed out by the 
trial judge, is the phrase, ". . .by taking and subscribing . . . 
M
 The trial judge stated: 
The language requires only that the affiant 
take the prescribed affidavit to a person 
authorized to administer oaths and there, 
before that officer, subscribe to the 
affidavit. There is no requirement in the 
statute that the affiant actually swear to an 
oath in addition to subscribing to the 
affidavit. If the legislature intended that 
3 
an oath be given other than the one that must 
be subscribed before a person authorized to 
administer oaths, it could have easily so 
provided. 
Bunch did all that was required by the statute. 
Rule 10(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part: 
The clerk of the court shall examine all 
pleadings and other papers filed with the 
court. If they are not prepared in conformity 
with this rule, the clerk shall accept the 
filing but may require counsel to substitute 
properly prepared papers for nonconforming 
papers. 
If § 21-7-3 requires Bunch to raise her hand and take an oath 
before signing an affidavit of impecuniosity, the clerk under Rule 
10(f) can still accept Bunch's affidavit but require her to 
substitute a corrected affidavit for the nonconforming one. The 
rule allows Bunch the opportunity to return to the notary, explain 
the problem, and sign a new affidavit after raising her hand and 
swearing an oath. While Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires an appeal to be filed within 30 days from the entry of the 
judgment or order, it does not require that the appeal be dismissed 
because a supporting affidavit of impecuniosity is not correct in 
every detail. It is submitted that historically most notaries 
witnessing affidavits of impecuniosity have not required the 
parties to raise their hand and swear to an oath. The law must be 
flexible enough to allow for mistakes of this nature to be 
corrected, otherwise, a party's fate will rest in the hands of the 
notary he or she may choose to use. Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of 
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Appellate Procedure, recognizes this in stating: 
Failure of an appellant to take any step other 
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal 
does not affect the validity of the appeal, 
but is grounds only for such action as the 
appellate court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the- appeal or other 
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the 
award of attorney fees. 
Englehorn cites Rule 3(f), Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, 
as support for his position. The rule states: 
At the time of filing any notice of separate, 
joint, or cross-appeal in a civil case, the 
party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk 
of the trial court such filing as are 
established by law, and also the fee for 
docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept 
a notice of appeal unless the filing and 
docketing fees are paid. 
Bunch believes Rule 3(f) is saying that if one is not impecunious, 
a fee must be paid by that person. The statute does no apply here 
because Bunch was impecunious at the time she commenced her appeal. 
Section 21-7-3 pertains to her situation and simply requires that 
she file an affidavit of impecuniosity with her notice of appeal. 
Bunch did that. 
Englehorn points out that in McClain v. Conrad, 431 P. 2d 571 
(Utah 1967) an appeal was dismissed because the filing fee was not 
paid until after the time for filing an appeal had run, though the 
notice of appeal had been left with the clerk prior to the appeal 
deadline. In this case no filing fee was involved and a filing 
took place within the prescribed period. For these reasons, 
McClain is distinguishable from this case. 
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POINT TWO 
THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE IS AN APPEALABLE ORDER 
Englehorn argues that the judgment of dismissal with prejudice 
is not a final order because the issue of attorney fees remains 
open. It appears that on the one hand Englehorn is stating that 
the appeal must be dismissed because it was not filed within thirty 
days, and on the other hand, that the case is not yet ripe for 
appeal. It is clear to Bunch that the ruling of the trial court 
was a final order. The trial judge stated: 
1. That Plaintiff's Complaint in this action 
should be and it hereby is, dismissed with 
prejudice and upon the merits, for the reason 
that no court or administrative order was ever 
obtained establishing the parties' 
relationship as a marriage within the required 
time limits. 
2. That should Defendant desired to claim 
attorney fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 (1953, 
as amended), he may do so through the filing 
of an appropriate motion, with appropriate 
supporting affidavit and memorandum, in order 
to give Plaintiff ample opportunity to 
respond. (Record on Appeal, pp. 000114-115.) 
In essence, the trial judge ordered that Bunch's complaint be 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits and that Englehorn 
have the right to pursue attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (1992) if desired. That ruling was final and adjudged 
all claims of the parties. Bunch's complaint was dismissed with 
prejudice and upon the merits and Englehorn's claim to puruse 
attorney fees was granted. Bunch seeks to overturn those rulings. 
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POINT THREE 
BUNCH IS NOT RAISING ANY ISSUES 
FOR THE FIRST TIME-ON APPEAL 
In this action the court dismissed Bunch's complaint with 
prejudice and upon the merits and ruled that Englehorn could pursue 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992), if he 
chose. Bunch has appealed that ruling by claiming that the trial 
court erred in finding that Bunch could not obtain a common law 
marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 because more than 
one year had elapsed since her relationship with Englehorn ended. 
Clearly, that issue was before the trial court. At the time of 
trial Englehorn moved the court to dismiss the complaint. He 
stated: 
Based on counsel's opening statement, we move 
to dismiss any claims based upon a common-law 
marriage based upon Subsection (2) of the 
statute . . . for the reason that by her own 
admission and statement, the relationship — 
even if there were such a relation ship — 
which we don't admit — terminated in the 
middle of August 1990 and as of this date in 
1993, there has never been any establishment 
by an administrative agency or by the Court 
that such a relationship constituted a 
statutory marriage. 
Bunch responded by saying: 
Well, I — I guess I'm confused. I — I 
thought filing a Complaint was to . . . to 
accomplish that very purpose to have that 
determination made. And because the trial has 
now occurred much more than a year since the 
relationship terminated, I can't see how that 
would — that should prejudice Ms. Bunch 
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simply because the trial has now occurred more 
than a year after. 
The court then stated: 
I don't see any authority there that says that 
the time is tolled from — from the point when 
you file a Complaint, . ^ . It says clearly 
that the determination or establishment of the 
marriage must occur within the relationship or 
within one year following the termination of 
the relationship. And admittedly by the 
facts, it hasn't occurred, has it? 
Bunch replied: 
Well, — if that's the way your going to 
interpret the statute, then I'm going to have 
to admit that, yes, but I — I guess I would 
have some concerns about the constitutionality 
of such a statute when it would make it — 
when a person files a Complaint to have that 
determination made, and simply because of the 
delays and court time and that sort of thing, 
it can't get it to court. 
The court later stated: 
And I don't think that's a constitutional 
question, because I think your entitled to 
bring a motion right at the outset of the case 
to have the Court examine this very issue and 
determine whether or not there's a valid 
marriage and establish that before we proceed 
with the issue of whether you can get a 
divorce. 
Bunch then stated: 
Well, if that's the interpretation of the 
statute, then I've got to — to concede that I 
don't have anything to contest that. (Record 
on Appeal, pp. 000145-147.) 
The quotations only reflect part of the discussion that took place 
on this issue, but they illustrate the point that at the time of 
trial the constitutionality of the statute in question was at 
issue. Bunch has simply appealed the court's interpretation of 
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that statute. Bunch was not required to detail her reasons for 
arguing that a complaint need only be filed within one year of the 
separation of the parties. 
The issue of attorney fees was also clearly raised at the time 
of trial. Englehorn asked the court to allow him to pursue 
attorney fees, pursuant to § 78-27-56 on the basis that Englehorn's 
complaint was frivolous. The court stated that Englehorn could do 
that in motion form at some time in the future on giving proper 
notice to Bunch. Bunch appealed that part of the court order as 
well. (Record on Appeal, pp. 000153-154.) 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted 
that the allegations raised by Englehorn in his brief are without 
merit and that the decision of the trial court to dismiss Bunch's 
complaint with prejudice and upon the merits based on section (2) 
of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 was in error. The trial court should 
have found section (2) to be a one year statute of limitations from 
the time of the parties separation. Otherwise, section (2) must be 
interpreted as a statute of repose and unconstitutional for 
violating Article I, section 11 and Article I, section 7 of our 
Utah constitution. The order of the trial court dismissing Bunch's 
complaint with prejudice should be reversed and the trial court 
instructed to set the matter for trial on Bunch's complaint and 
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Englehorn's answer• 
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